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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRYCE C. REYNOLDS and 
LaDONNA REYNOLDS, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STEWART VAN WAGONER, 
Defendant. 
RICHLAND, INC. , 
Plaintiff in Interven-
tion-Respondent, 
vs. 
BRYCE c. REYNOLDS and 
LaDONNA REYNOLDS, his wife; 
and SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants in Interven-
tion-Appellants. 
Case No. 15715 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff in intervention and respondent, Rich-
land, Inc. (hereafter "Richland"), contract purchaser from 
defendant Bryce C. Reynolds, individually and as debtor in 
possession and trustee in bankruptcy of Bryce C. Reynolds, 
debtor, and Anna LaDonna Reynolds, his wife (hereafter 
"Reynolds"), of certain property under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract claims that the payment of the taxes, interest and 
Penalties by Reynolds at a tax sale constitutes an election 
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by Reynolds under paragraph 14 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract to pay the taxes and to receive reimbursement from 
Richland. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The motion for summary jugment of Richland was 
granted, the District Court ruling that Reynolds was en-
titled to sums paid to Salt Lake County for the tax deed, 
together with interest, and Richland, having tendered pay-
ment for sums paid by Reynolds, was entitled to receive all 
interest acquired by Reynolds in the tax sale of the pro-
perty. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Richland asks that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed and that Richland be awarded its 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Richland does not disagree with the Statement of 
Facts insofar as set forth in Appellants' Brief; however, 
the Statement of Facts as contained therein is incomplete 
and the following is submitted to supplement the Statement 
of Facts in Appellants' Brief. 
On August 23, 1963, Bryce c. Reynolds, individ-
ually and as debtor in proceedings for an arrangement 
before the Bankruptcy Court in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, entered 
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into a stipulation with Motor Lease, Inc., a secured credi-
tor, regarding the real property in question in this matter 
and other matters in issue before the Bankruptcy Court (see 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 36, R.213, and R.120-154). The 
stipulation was subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
Thereafter, Reynolds executed and delivered an 
escrow agreement dated September 27, 1963 (see Answers to 
Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8, R.209 and R.110-15). The 
documents submitted to the escrow agent to be held by it and 
disposed of as provided in the escrow agreement included a 
Quit-Claim Deed, Uniform Real Estate Contract, Assignment, 
and Release of Mortgages (see Answers to Interrogatories 
Nos. 3-6 and 9-13, R.209-10, R.106-9, R.116-19). As stated 
in Appellants' Brief: "All of the instruments were autho-
rized by the Bankruptcy Court" (Appellants' Brief, p.3). 
On the 12th day of January, 1965, Bryce C. Rey-
nolds, debtor, and his attorney in the matter of Bryce C. 
Reynolds, dba Reynolds Sand & Gravel Company, debtor, in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division, petitioned the Referee in Bankruptcy to 
set aside the stipulation between Bryce C. Reynolds and 
Motor Lease, Inc. (see Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 37 
and 38, R.213-14, and R.155-59). 
On July 6, 1965, an order was entered in the 
matter of Bryce c. Reynolds, dba Reynolds Sand & Gravel Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Company, debtor, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, denying the petition to set aside the 
stipulation (see Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 39 and 40, 
R.214 and R.158-59). 
The escrow agreement provides in part that if 
Richland fails to make the payments when due, or fails to 
perform any other term or condition of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, upon written demand to the escrow agent 
"said deeds, abstracts, real estate contract and assignme~ 
then held by [the escrow agent] shall be delivered to [Rey-
nolds]" (R.111-12). If Richland made the payments when due 
and performed the other terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, the escrow agent was to deliver the documents to 
Richland. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract (R.106-8) pro-
vides for a purchase price of $127,966.44, payable at the 
rate of $800 per month. Paragraph 14 of ~he contract pro-
vides: 
In the event the Buyer shall default 
in the payment of any special or general 
taxes, assessments or insurance premiums 
as herein provided, the Seller may, at 
his option, pay said taxes, assessments 
and insurance premiums or either of them, 
and if Seller elects so to do, then Buyer 
agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, 
all such sums so advanced and paid by him, 
together with interest thereon from the 
date of payment of said SUI~3 at the rate 
of three-fourths of one percent per month 
until paid. 
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paragraph 21 of the contract provides: 
The Buyer and Seller each agree that 
should they default in any of the cove-
nants or agreements contained herein, that 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs 
and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing this agreement, or in ob-
taining possession of the premises covered 
hereby or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the statutes of the state 
of Utah, whether such remedy is pursued 
by filing a suit or otherwise. 
The Assignment (R.109) assigned to Motor Lease, 
Inc. all sums due under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
However, it specifically provided that the contract was not 
assigned, but that the assignors reserved all of the rights 
and privileges and retained all duties and obligations they 
may have under the contract. 
In 1963, when the stipulation was entered into, 
the property which is the subject of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was subject to loans or obligations against the 
property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan 
Association and The Lockhart Company (see Contract, •6, 
R.106-8). Richland paid the obligations until paid in full, 
which payments included the amounts for property taxes until 
the end of 1972. Prudential received the tax notices until 
the obligation was paid in full in 1972. Thereafter, Rich-
land did not receive notice of the taxes or the amounts 
thereof (see Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 6, R.92). 
On May 26, 1976, Reynolds paid the taxes and 
penalties for the years 1972 through 1975 and received a tax 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library S rvices nd Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 6 -
deed. On September 24, 1976, Reynolds filed their complaint 
in unlawful detainer against Richland's lessee (R.2,3). on 
October 14, 1976, Richland served its Motion for Interven-
tion on the parties (R.4,5). The motion was granted and on 
November 2, 1976, Richland filed its complaint in interven-
tion (R.19-23) and deposited the amount paid by Reynolds for 
the taxes and penalties, together with interest (see •6 of 
Complaint in Intervention, R.21, and R.28 and 29). 
Richland has made the payments due under the real 
estate contract and has performed the other conditions of 
the contract (see Answer to Interrogatory No. 2(e), R.90). 
The district court's memorandum decision is quoted 
at length in Appellants' Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTRACTS ENTERED 
INTO BETWEEN RICHLAND AND REYNOLDS WERE ABANDONED 
BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT. 
In bankruptcy proceedings in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Utah, Bryce C. 
Reynolds, as an individual and as debtor in possesion, and 
Anna LaDonna Reynolds, his wife, entered into a stipulation 
with Motor Lease, Inc., a secured creditor (R.120-54). The 
stipulation is dated August 23, 1963. The parties to the 
stipulation structured the transaction as a resolution of 
certain issues in the bankruptcy proceeding, subject to the 
approval of the Bankruptcy Court. Subsequently, on Janu-
ary 12, 1965, Reynolds attempted to set aside the stipula-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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tion (R.155). The Referee in Bankruptcy denied the petition 
to set aside the stipulation (R.158-9). 
Richland is current in its payments under the real 
estate contract and has otherwise performed its obligations 
thereunder. Richland would not continue to make payments 
under the contract if it had been abandoned. 
Reynolds assert that the contract has been aban-
doned by the parties. However, there is. no evidence of 
abandonment and, on the contrary, the evidence is that the 
contract has not been abandoned. The rule apparently relied 
upon by Reynolds is contained in 17A C.J.S., Contract, §412: 
Rights acquired under a contract may be 
abandoned or relinquished by agreement, 
conduct, or by a contract clearly indi-
cating such purpose. To constitute an 
abandonment of rights an actual intent 
to abandon must exist. Such intent may 
be inferred from the conduct of the parties. 
An abandonment of rights does not occur 
unless the promissee, with a full knowl-
edge of all the material facts, does or 
bears the doing of something inconsistent 
with the right or with an intention to 
rely on it . . . . (Footnotes omitted.) 
The facts are undisputed that the parties entered 
into a stipulation in the Bankruptcy Court, that as a result 
of the stipulation the various contracts among the parties 
were entered into and placed with the escrow agent, the 
Bankcuptcy Court refused to set aside the stipulation among 
the parties, and Richland is current in its payments under 
the real estate contract. Reynolds appear to seek some 
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relief on the basis that Reynolds have been abandoned as a 
party to the contract, not that the contract itself has be~ 
abandoned. 
Although it may be said that Reynolds had no 
regular or frequent responsibilities under the contracts, it 
cannot be said that Reynolds had no rights, duties or re-
sponsibilities thereunder. Furthermore, when an escrow is 
established, one or more parties to the escrow may have no 
affirmative requirements thereafter, but may merely be 
entitled to await the other party's performance, at which 
time the escrow agent performs the responsibilities of one 
or more parties. In Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252, 112 P.2d 
153 (1941), cert. den'd 314 U.S. 584, the plaintiff asserted 
that the death of a principal to an escrow agreement revoked 
the escrow agent's authority. In holding otherwise, this 
Court quoted the correct rule as follows: 
·~ntil the escrow contract has been made, 
the depositary has no rights or authority 
enforceable at law, but when it has been 
made and the instrument deposited, he be-
comes the agent of both parties; and the 
death of a party prior to the performance 
of the condition, does not affect the 
depositary's obligation to perform the 
duties imposed upon him by the escrow 
contract. When the condition upon which 
the instrument is to take effect is per-
formed, the depositary becomes a mere 
agent or trustee of the grantee and his 
possession is equivalent to possession 
by the grantee." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 9 -
In Doxey-Layton v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah, 
1976), this Court stated: "A deed in escrow, under a condi-
tional sales contract, is effective as a conveyance after 
performance of the contract obligations, and upon delivery 
by the depositary." This requires the continued validity of 
the contract until completion of the escrow. 
In the present case, the escrow agreement provides 
that in the event Richland does not make the payments under 
the contract or does not comply with other provisions of the 
contract, Reynolds may demand the return of the documents. 
Further, Reynolds retained all rights in the contract, but 
merely assigned to Motor Lease, Inc., Reynolds' secured 
creditor, the proceeds to be paid by Richland under the real 
estate contract. 
The stipulation approved by the Bankruptcy Court 
and the contracts among the parties established a contrac-
tual relationship. Reynolds here seek to have this court 
set aside the entire purpose and effect of the contract, as 
well as the contract itself. Reynolds assert that since the 
contract relieves them of any additional responsibilities 
and that it could be completed without any further act on 
their part, that Reynolds ought to be deemed, as a matter of 
law, to have been abandoned as parties to the contract. 
In King v. Firm, 3 U.2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955), 
the Court, referring to 12 Arn.Jur., Contracts, §442, ana-
lyzed what is required for the abandonment of a contract. 
The Court stated: 
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We agree that the evidence is conclusive 
that none of the parties to the second 
note and mortgage considered them to be 
valid and subsisting instruments. 
King by releasing the first mortgage and 
writing thereon that the sum paid included 
interest and payment of an attorney's fee 
for "unused papers" acted in a manner in-
consistent with the existence of any rights 
under the second note and mortgage and 
thereby showed that he had abandoned any 
such rights which he may have had, and 
certainly the other parties acquiesced 
in this. 
King properly requires evidence of mutual agreement of 
abandonment or conduct clearly indicating such purpose. 
The record is totally devoid of any evidence of 
any nature whatsoever that Richland abandoned the contract 
by its agreement or by its conduct. The evidence is other-
wise. In absence of some evidence raising the issue of 
abandonment, the trial court acted properly in granting the 
motion for summary judgment. 
The ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is res judicata 
of the validity of the stipulation and contracts among the 
parties. Reynolds attempted to have the stipulation set 
aside in the Bankruptcy Court. They should not be allowed 
to approach another forum in order to obtain a different 
result. As stated by this Court in Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 
U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962): 
Policy would seem to indicate that 
when a plaintiff has once attempted to 
obtain his entire relief, based upon his 
entire claim, then the matter should be 
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laid at rest. He should be denied a 
second attempt at substantially the same 
objective under a different guise. (Foot-
note omitted.) 
see also East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 
Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863 (1945). 
POINT II. THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
REMAIN IN EFFECT EVEN IF THE INTERESTS THEREUNDER 
ARE CONVERTED BY THE THEORY OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION. 
Reynolds assert the theory of equitable conversion 
affords them relief. The following is a general description 
of the theory of equitable conversions: 
Equitable conversion is that constructive 
alteration in the nature or character of 
property whereby, in equity, real estate 
is for certain purposes considered as per-
sonalty, or whereby personalty, for simi-
lar considerations, is regarded as real 
estate, and in either instance, it is deemed 
to be transmissable and descendable in its 
converted form. (Footnote omitted.) 27 
Am.Jur.2d, Equitable Conversion, §1. 
The application and the limitations of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel are explained in 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equitable 
Conversion, §3: 
The application of the doctrine of equi-
table conversion depends somewhat on 
the circumstances under which it is in-
voked, since the doctrine is not a fixed 
rule of law, but proceeds on equitable 
principles which take into account the 
result to be accomplished. The doctrine 
is most frequently applied in solving 
questions concerning the validity and 
execution of trusts, the legal character 
of the interests of the beneficiaries, 
the devolution of property as between 
real and personal representatives, and 
for other similar purposes. Equitable Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institut  of Museum and Library Services 
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conversion of property is not favored in 
law, however, and the doctrine does not 
exist as a matter of right. It is to be 
invoked only when required by necessity 
and justice. And even where required the 
conversion must be kept within the limits 
of actual necessity. The application of 
the doctrine is always withheld where its 
effect would be contrary to the intention 
of the testator, settlor, or contracting 
parties. Moreover, the doctrine will never 
be employed for the purpose of circumventing 
public policy, or to sustain a fraud or a 
wrongful act. Nor, it has been held, will 
the doctrine be extended so as to effect a 
conversion as to persons whose claims or 
rights to the property are purely inci-
dental, and not at all connected with its 
devolution or transfer from the owner or 
through the instrument. (Emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted.) 
The thrust of Reynolds' argument appears to be 
that if the theory of equitable conversion applies to the 
real estate contract, thus converting the interest of the 
vendor to personalty or the right to receive the payments 
from the vendee, Reynolds cease to be parties to the con-
tract or that Reynolds have no further rights, responsi-
bilities or obligations with respect to the contract. 
Even if the theory of equitable conversion is 
applicable to the real estate contract, it does not follow 
that the effect of application of the theory of equitable 
conversion is as claimed by Reynolds, that of eliminating 
Reynolds as a party to the contract or absolving Reynolds of 
any rights, responsibilities or obligations thereunder. 
Although Allred v. Allred, 15 U.2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (196 41 
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and In re Estate of Willson, 28 U.2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 
(1972), both hold, under the facts before the Court in each 
case, that the interest of the vendor of real property under 
an enforceable executory contract is converted to personalty, 
neither case indicates in any manner that the contractual 
relationships established by the contracts are altered. In 
Allred, the Court stated: 
It is not contended that the vendors did 
not have an enforceable contract upon 
which they could have sued for specific 
performance in the event the vendees 
should have refused to perform their 
part of the agreement. 
Similarly, if Richland fails to make the payments required 
by the real estate contract or fails to perform other re-
quirernents of the contract, Reynolds remain entitled to all 
of the remedies provided by the real estate contract or 
provided by law. To accept Reynolds' argument would be to 
negate the terms and provisions of the real estate contract 
merely because the nature of the vendor's rights thereunder 
are converted from realty to personalty. 
Stipulations and settlements are favored and are 
not to be set aside lightly. This Court has been reluctant 
to set aside stipulations of parties. See Buzianas v. Bene-
ficial Homes, Inc., 550 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1976); Klein v. Klein, 
544 P.2d 766 (Utah, 1975); United Factors v. T. C. Associates, 
~, 445 P.2d 766, 21 U.2d 351 (1968); and Johnson v. Peoples 
Unance & Thrift Co., 2 U.2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 (1954). In 
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Johnson, the parties to a quiet title action entered into a 
stipulation before the Court at a pretrial conference for 
the resolution of the dispute. The stipulation provided 
that the parties would exchange quit-claim deeds to clear 
title to the property actually within each party's fence 
lines and provided that a new contract would be executed to 
adjust the price the buyer would pay because of a reduction 
in the property to be acquired. The parties failed to 
perform the terms of the stipulation. The trial court 
entered judgment embodying the terms of the stipulation. In 
response to the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment, this 
Court stated: 
The plaintiffs argue that it was never con-
templated or agreed by the parties that the 
stipulations would be the basis for any judg-
ment except a judgment dismissing the case. 
They refer us to the statement made by the 
court at the close of the pretrial conference, 
to which all parties assented, viz., that 
he would hold the case until the parties 
had made their conveyances and that he 
would then dismiss the case upon their 
joining in a petition to that effect. We 
agree with the plaintiffs that obviously 
such was the intention of the parties 
and the court at that time. However, when 
the parties failed to perform in accordance 
with the stipulations, the court was not 
powerless to require them to abide by their 
agreement. It would indeed be a serious 
reflection upon our system of jurisprudence 
if parties could stipulate an agreement of 
settlement but refuse with impunity from 
performing. Courts are not impotent when 
one or more parties to a stipulation becomes 
recalcitrant. . . . We think the trial 
court took the proper course when he entered 
judgment embodying the terms of the stipula-
tion. (Emphasis added.) 
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Reynolds have suffered no injury. Richland ten-
dered the amount Reynolds paid for taxes and penalties, 
together with applicable interest. This Court should not 
set aside the stipulation approved by the Bankruptcy Court 
or take any action which would have similar effect. 
POINT III.REYNOLDS' PAYMENT OF TAXES ENTITLES REYNOLDS TO 
REIMBURSEMENT FROM RICHLAND. 
Paragraph 14 of the real estate contract provides 
that Reynolds, as Seller, at Seller's option, may pay the 
special or general taxes "and if Seller elects so to do, 
then Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such 
sums so advanced and paid by him, together with interest 
thereon .... " In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 25 U.2d 
244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971), this Court held that the seller 
was entitled to reimbursement for its payment of property 
taxes. This Court so held even though upon the buyer's 
request, the seller gave buyer a payoff figure, which was 
paid by buyer, and a special warranty deed was issued. The 
payoff amount given by the seller and paid by the buyer did 
not include the real estate taxes, which the seller had 
paid. The buyer asserted, under such circumstances, accord 
and satisfaction. The Court held that the evidence was not 
sufficient to establish an agreement that the parties would 
accept a substitute performance, but "on the contrary, both 
parties were rendering performance strictly in accordance 
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Richland tendered the amount of taxes and penal-
ties, together with applicable interest. The Court should 
affirm the trial court and award such amount to Reynolds. 
POINT IV. RICHLAND SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
The real estate contract provides: 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree 
that should they default in any of the cove-
nants or agreements contained herein, that 
the defaulting party shall pay all costs 
and expenses, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining 
possession of the premises covered hereby, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder 
or by the statutes of the State of Utah, 
whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
a suit or otherwise. 
Reynolds have refused to accept the tender of 
Richland of the monies paid for taxes upon the real pro-
perty. Richland submits that under all the circumstances 
and in view of Reynolds' action, Richland is entitled to 
attorney's fees as awarded at the trial court and on appeal. 
Attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the Supreme 
Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., l 
U.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); see also Bates v. Bates, 560 
P.2d 706 (1977). Since responding to Reynolds' appeal has 
been necessary in enforcing the real estate contract, Rich-
land submits that attorney's fees on appeal are proper. 
Attorney's fees on appeal should be granted in such amount 
to be determined by the trial court upon proper evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence that Richland abandoned the 
contract by its agreement or by its conduct; the evidence is 
that the contract has been honored by Richland, which has 
paid the amounts required by the contract. The Bankruptcy 
court has previously declined to allow the contract to be 
set aside, and that ruling is res judicata of Reynolds' 
claim now. 
The contract remains in effect even if certain 
interests thereunder are converted by the theory of equita-
ble conversion; the contractual relationships between the 
parties remain unaffected. 
Richland asks this Court affirm the judgment of 
the trial court and to award it attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By~---..,~~---::---:-....,-,~~~~~~-
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorneys for Richland, Inc. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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